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ABSTRACT
Talcot Parsons suggested in 1963 that there are basically three kinds of
authority: utilitarian authority, coercive authority, and persuasive
authority. In this paper, I show that the models developed by Gibbons
and Rutten (1997), Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Akerlof
(1976) and Basu (1986) can be viewed as models where issues such as
authority, power, inﬂuence and ideology, in the sense of Parsons, can
be formally discussed. I also show the existence of an interesting
difﬁculty in providing a contractarian interpretation of the State under
the Parsonian view of governmental authority discussed in this paper.
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1. Introduction
The question of what a government is and how it works is a fascinating
one for economists for a variety of reasons. I want to mention three of
them. First, there is no hope of understanding the workings of a modern
economy without a clear picture of how the design and implementation
of policy affects and is affected by the behavior of the non-government
side of the social system. Second, one never sees a government. What
one sees instead is the behavior of a group of individuals that one
interprets as government behavior. The repeated observation of such
behavior deﬁnes what a government is. The fact that the government is
at the interpreted level of the set of social interactions that we observe in
the world is indicative of the fundamental role that beliefs play in
deﬁning that which we in ordinary language call institutions.
The third reason why the topic is of great interest to economists is
also the main motivation behind this paper: the fact that there is a

peculiar relationship between the demand for government and the extent
to which collective action problems are pervasive in a speciﬁc social
situation. To elaborate on this, recall that for sufﬁciently low transaction
costs we can expect collective action problems to vanish, for the
individuals in the collectivity should be able to agree on (1) performing
the actions that lead to an efﬁcient allocation of resources, and (2) agree
on a transfer scheme that leaves each individual in a position that is no
worse off than before, and at least one individual in a better position.
This is, of course, the Coase theorem, and it is a perfectly ﬁne argument
for solving a variety of collective action problems but not all of them. It
is clear from the applications of the principle that the source of authority
that makes the contracts enforceable comes from outside the social
domain that is the object of study. Once one assumes away an
unmodeled source of authority a very different theorem, the so-called
‘Hobbes theorem’, argues that it is the collective employment of
coercive force that will determine the allocation rule.1
This situation is not exclusive to the literature on collective action
problems. In virtually all models of economics there is an unmodeled
source of authority that plays a crucial role at some stage of the analysis.
Most of the time the bearer of such authority is a simpliﬁed entelechy
that we call the government, which we sometimes endow with a set of
preferences and actions that act as a simpliﬁcation of the political
system, and which we do not derive as the result of some underlying
game among the citizens. Whether we can deal without an unmodeled
source of authority in our models is a real challenge, for we do not
clearly understand what authority means.
Partly in response to this problem a wide variety of approaches have
been proposed to shed partial light on the subject of modeling limited
governments. Most of those approaches aim at explaining the mixture of
contractual and predatory activities in which governments decide to
engage.2 The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to review those approaches which
explicitly attempt to understand what the source of authority is, and to
show that a formalization of the concepts of power and inﬂuence, as
deﬁned by Parsons (1963), is consequently available because of them. I
do this in the subsequent section.
Parsons (1963) argues that there are basically three kinds of authority:
utilitarian authority, coercive authority, and persuasive authority. I show
that the models developed by Gibbons and Rutten (1997), Hirshleifer
(1991), Skaperdas (1992), Akerlof (1976) and Basu (1986) can be
interpreted as models where issues such as authority, power, inﬂuence
and ideology, in the sense of Parsons, can be formally discussed. The

discussion sheds additional light on the relationship between power and
beliefs, the role and effectiveness of governments with different sources
of authority, and the extent to which different notions of authority can
be captured in different solution concepts.
Much insight can be gained by examining those models. The second
goal of this paper, however, is to show that two problems still pervade
the formal modeling of government in game-theoretic terms: (1) that
there is always a version of the Coase theorem that makes the
government a redundant entity in the social domain, and (2) that the
introduction of agents with authority to solve a collective action
problem creates a collective action problem itself: that of controlling the
government. In the Discussion, I explain the source of the persistence of
these problems in the formal modeling of governments. In conclusion, I
argue that these results may complicate a contractarian interpretation of
the state, which requires us to revise the theory of economic policy that
has been developed with such interpretation in mind.
Before entering into the subject matter I want to say that the need for
providing adequate foundations for the ﬁeld of public economics in the
way the literature I review strives to attain is more than purely aesthetic.
Instead, it relies on the fact that neither private, nor public policy design
is invariant to how authority is distributed in society, because this
determines the structure of the sets of contracts that can be enforced in
courts of law, and the structure of the sets of contracts that can be selfenforced. That is why a good theory of government, whenever available,
will be an essential building block of the ﬁelds of public economics and
contract theory.
2. Modeling Limited Governments
2.1 Power and Beliefs
Why should you do as I say? The literature on power and politics has
identiﬁed three sources for the authority that I have, as a matter of fact,
if you indeed do as I say. First, there is the possibility that you believe I
will, in return, do something that is very good for you. Second, there is
the possibility that you believe I will do something that is very bad for
you if you do not do as I say. Third, there is the possibility that you
believe that not me but others will do things to you such that it is in your
best interest to do as I say, and that those beliefs cannot be directly
deduced from the examination of the social situation in question.
Whichever is the case, I am a powerful man: you do as I say. The

authority that I have is not induced by what I do, but on what you
believe can happen to you if you do not do as I say. Authority is
instituted in me through your systems of beliefs. Moreover, authority is
not a property of mine but, instead, a feature of the relationship between
you and I. I can therefore deﬁne authority as a property of the
interaction between you and I in which you do as I say. This simple
terminology introduced, we can quickly note that the ﬁrst source of
authority we examined is that which Parsons (1963) calls utilitarian
authority, the second source of authority is that which Parsons calls
coercive authority, and the third source of authority that we examined is
that which Parsons calls persuasive authority.
Note that these distinctions make ﬁner points about the source of
authority than those which the game-theoretic apparatus can formally
capture, for every source ought to be persuasive and ‘utilitarian’ if it is
to have any bearing on behavior.3 Further, the coercive and the
utilitarian can be made equivalent, in a decision-theoretic sense, without
difﬁculty.4 We will see below that, despite this fact, it is worth keeping
Parson’s classiﬁcation for the purpose of model building.
2.2 Beliefs and Actions
If only one, the message of game theory is that whenever players reach
an equilibrium in actions, beliefs about behavior are severely restricted,
if not completely determined. Translated into the language of power and
politics this means that there is a limit on the authority that I can
exercise over you, regardless of its source. That is, game-theoretic
models of authority are necessarily models of limited authority in the
sense that they do not allow omnipotence.5 This is not to say that the
effect of my authority on your behavior is independent of the type of
authority I use to support it. Indeed, different sources of authority have
very different effects on your behavior. Before we turn our attention to
those issues it is important to understand the exact role that the authority
of a ruler can play in solving collective action problems.
2.3 Authority and Efﬁciency
The importance of a ruler with authority in enhancing efﬁciency has
long been recognized. The needs to coordinate expectations, facilitate
communication, enforce contracts and prevent conﬂicts have always
been associated with the demand for a ruler that will be believed to act
concerning that which is considered a social goal. A good example of
what has been written about this issue is the work of Douglass North.

According to North (1990: 57), ‘the inevitable conclusion that one
arrives at in a wealth-maximizing world is that complex contracting that
would allow one to capture the gains from trade in a world of
impersonal exchange must be accompanied by some kind of third-party
enforcement’. This is so, according to North (1990: 57), for two reasons.
‘First, it is necessary to form a communications mechanism that
provides the information necessary to know when punishment is
required . . . Second, because punishment is often a public good in which
the community beneﬁts but the costs are borne by a small set of
individuals.’ These communications, contracting and enforcement mech
anisms, it is argued, can be provided by the third-party, or State, in the
presumption that the costs of those mechanisms being provided without
the State are prohibitively high. There is a danger to this argument,
North (1990: 59) adds: if the State has meaningful authority over the
rest of the citizens ‘then those who run the state will use that force in
their own interest at the expense of the rest of society’. The models that
I present and discuss below can be viewed as a formalization of North’s
questions and concerns about the abuse of authority by governments
and, more generally, about the need for third-party enforcement.
2.4 A Model of Utilitarian Authority
Gibbons and Rutten (1997) have condensed a great deal of insight about
power and politics from both the political science and the political
economy literature in a model they use to explain the abuse of authority
by governments. I present a simpliﬁed version of their work below.
Begin by assuming a social situation where cooperation, while bene
ﬁcial, is not automatic, and where there is an individual empowered by
everyone else to punish those who do not cooperate. This situation can
be captured by the (stage) game in Table 1. In Table 1, citizen A
chooses rows, citizen B chooses columns, and citizen K (the ruler)
chooses the tax system t  (tc, td, tf ) representing respectively a tax on
mutual cooperation, a tax on mutual defection and a tax on unilateral
defection, respectively. Players are assumed to be risk-neutral, and
everyone has an outside option O (e.g. leave the country) with utility
equal to one.
Table 1. Utilitarian authority
C

D

C

3  tc, 3  tc, 2tc

0, 4  tf, tf

D

4  tf, 0, tf

1  td, 1  td, 2td

Note that a choice of t  0 leaves citizens A and B essentially playing
a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The source of authority of K in this example is
unmodeled in the sense that, once K has announced the tax system t, the
citizens have no option to renege on it. In this context one can see that
there is a Nash equilibrium of the static game where the tax system is
designed to induce citizens A and B to cooperate. It is also true in this
setup that the same authority that can be used to foster the creation of
gains from cooperation can be used to extract the gains from the citizens
through higher taxes. In particular, it can be shown that whenever the
introduction of a rational, self-interested ruler in the static game restores
the efﬁciency, the ruler collects all the gains from cooperation. This leads
to the following irrelevance proposition about government behavior for
the case analyzed above. The proof is reproduced in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. The set of payoffs attainable by the citizens in Nash equilibria of the
static game with collective action problems described above is invariant under the
addition of a rational, self-interested ruler with unmodeled authority.

Of course, this need not be the case when we examine the situation
where the citizens face a positive probability q that the game will be
played at least one more time in the future. This possibility allows
outcomes where not all the efﬁciency gains are kept by the ruler, if the
probability of continuation is sufﬁciently high. There is a limit,
however, on the amount that the citizens can keep in equilibrium.
Assume that in a public event citizens A and B accept no tax on
unilateral defection and announce independently the following strategy,
in an attempt to capture some of the gains from cooperation:
I will play C if no one has ever played D to date, and if K has never levied a (per
capita) tax on mutual cooperation above τ. Otherwise, I will defect.

It is not hard to see that for the ruler not to extract all the gains from
cooperation and to preserve incentives (which in this case requires
ensuring that A and B have no reasons to deviate from the strategies
announced above), the citizens will want to announce a tax τ that is at
most 4q  2.
The tax proposed by the citizens cannot be too low, however, because
then the ruler would prefer to tax a low output (mutual defection) at a
high rate rather than to tax a higher output (the gains from cooperation)
at a lower tax rate. It can be shown that, in the example above, the
lowest possible value of τ that the ruler will accept is 4  3q. The
presence of this lower bound is what keeps the citizens from obtaining a
higher share of the gains from cooperation. As a consequence, in an
efﬁcient equilibrium at least 50% of the gains from efﬁciency will

always remain in the hands of the ruler. These results are summarized
below (the proofs are reproduced in the Appendix).
Proposition 2. The set of payoffs attainable in subgame perfect equilibria of the
repeated game with collective action problems described above as the probability
of continuation goes to one is not invariant under the addition of a rational, selfinterested ruler with unmodeled authority. In particular, the set of payoffs
attainable by the non-rulers is bounded away from the Pareto frontier of the utility
possibility set.

To conclude, we see that the ruler levies taxes in both the static and the
repeated version of the game by Gibbons and Rutten, but it is naturally
the repeated version which teaches us the most. In particular, we learn
that repetition allows the citizens to regain a great deal of the power that
was lost to the ruler since her empowerment. What this means is that the
source of authority in the Gibbons and Rutten model is explained as a
combination of the unmodeled source of authority that the ruler has to
begin with, and the endogenously determined limits to such authority
that the citizens can set through the beliefs about their behavior that the
ruler will have at a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
Since the source of authority that is modeled depends mostly on
expected utility calculations done by the citizens that can be deduced
from the examination of the game, and that whatever role coercion plays
is unmodeled, I believe that the source of authority that this model
explains is mostly of the utilitarian type. One could argue that the
beliefs held by the citizen can also be described as coercive in the sense
that they can be rewritten in the form of credible threats that prevent the
citizens from deviating from the equilibrium strategies. This is true, as I
mentioned at the beginning of this section, but I want to reserve the term
coercive to situations where an explicit model of conﬂict besides the one
implicit in the collective action problem is added to the social situation
to be examined.
A complication in the interpretation of this model is that, if in the
state of nature citizens A and B decide on a social contract to deal with
the collective action problem embedded on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is
not clear that they would have chosen one in which they empower a
ruler. To see why, note that for any probability of continuation q where
a ruler gives them some of the gains from cooperation the citizens can
do better by playing the standard trigger strategies against each other
and having a disempowered government. This is the case because the
folk theorem holds in this case for any probability of continuation
greater than 14. This means that the analysis by Gibbons and Rutten is
useful only when there is a barrier to the application of the folk theorem

that cannot be made dependent on q, or when there is a good reason to
assume that the authority was already in the hands of a speciﬁc actor.
Gibbons and Rutten believe the barrier has to be understood as
communication costs: in a large society it will be difﬁcult to keep
everyone informed of all the partial histories of play, a necessary datum
in the construction of the cooperative equilibrium. The problem with
this argument is that, as it is often done, costs that are crucial for their
results are left unmodeled. In the next section, I present a model
intended to provide an alternative explanation: one based in explicit
conﬂict arising between the citizens, the outcome of which determines
the balance of power in society.
2.5 A Model of Coercive Authority
Suppose that at the end of the day, right after you have harvested your
bushel of corn, I come and say to you: ‘give it to me, or I will beat you
up’. Now suppose you do not give it to me. What will happen is that we
will engage in a ﬁght, and there is a chance of you winning and a chance
of me winning. If you win, you will take all my corn, and if I win, I will
be happy to take all your corn. Now this is about real conﬂict!
An additional feature that one could add to the conﬂict just described
has to do with the realization that those probabilities of winning are not
likely to be independent of the size of the output that we are defending.
The higher the size of my output relative to yours, the higher my odds of
winning, either because a relatively high output can ﬁnance a better
military technology, or just because I ﬁght harder when there is
relatively more at stake.
Models with features that are similar to these exist and have been
developed by Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaperdas (1992) to understand the
relationship between the productive and predatory sectors of the
economy.6 In this section, I use some of the tools they develop in a very
simpliﬁed manner. They model the production side of the game
assuming the existence of two goods, one that can be consumed directly
and one that gives you an edge over your opponent in the conﬂict but
that does not enter your preference function directly. Here I present a
simpler version with only one resource which both affects the odds of
winning and enters directly in the preference function of the players.7
There is a sense in which any game with interesting properties can be
given an interpretation that matches the story given above. An even
more interesting position is to take a game of interest assuming that the
payoffs reﬂect the existence of unmodeled authority and then replacing

Table 2. Prisoners’ Dilemma
C

D

C

3, 3

0, 4

D

4, 0

1, 1

such unmodeled authority with conﬂicts of the type described in the
previous paragraphs. For instance, take a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Table 2)
and replace the unmodeled authority with conﬂict situations every
where. The game transforms into that shown in Table 3 where p(xi, xi)
is the probability that individual i wins the contest given that the payoff
to defend is xi and that the payoff that citizen -i wants to defend is xi.
The function p is often called a contest success function, and it has the
following properties: it is increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing
in the other, it is a probability distribution function, and it assigns
identical probabilities to individuals of equal resource base.8
With this in mind, we can analyze the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the
conﬂict depicted above. As can be expected, the coercive structure
imposed on the game can lead to an allocation of resources that is
different from the one obtained with unmodeled authority. First, note
that since p(x,x)  12 the game turns into that shown in Table 4 where
there are no further restrictions on p : p(0,4) besides p(0,4) < p(0,0)
 12. In this context, the interpretation is that p(4,0) > p(0,4) because
there is a degree of speciﬁcity of the outcome at stake that is of value
only to the original producer, and this gets reﬂected in the value of p.
It is not hard to see that for any p  (14, 12] the strategy proﬁle (C, C) is
a Nash equilibrium of the game. On the other hand, for any p smaller
than 14 the only equilibrium of the game is (D,D). Call the game with
Table 3. Prisoners’ Dilemma with conﬂict
C

D

C

6p(3, 3), 6p(3, 3)

4p(0, 4), 4p(4, 0)

D

4p(4,0), 4p(0, 4)

2p(1, 1), 2p(1, 1)

Table 4. Prisoners’ Dilemma with conﬂict, p(x, x)
 12
C

D

C

3, 3

4p, 4(1  p)

D

4(1  p), 4p

1, 1

collective action problems and conﬂict over the distribution of resources
the game with coercive authority and let the measure of symmetry of the
distribution of power be given by closeness of p to 12. We have thus
proved the following result for the game described above.
Proposition 3. In the static game with collective action problems and coercive
authority described above the efﬁcient allocation can be supported as a Nash
equilibrium of the coercive game for any sufﬁciently symmetric distribution of
power.

What we have learned from the exercise is that the fact that there will be
conﬂict may decrease the expected beneﬁts from deviating if the
likelihood of winning the conﬂict does not increase too quickly with the
amount of resources at stake. Therefore, one could obtain an efﬁcient
allocation of resources that is supported by the exercise of mutual
coercion, and that works without a ruler. In models like this, we can
explain the phenomenon of cooperation in autarchy without appealing
to repeated games considerations. Once the game is played repeatedly of
course, one is able to solve the collective action problem if the
probability that the game will be repeated is sufﬁciently high, and this
will hold regardless of the value of p.
Now assume for the moment that we introduce into the analysis a
third citizen, K, who produces nothing but has probability (not coming
from a contest success function) arbitrarily close to one of winning a
contest against every citizen and therefore collecting the entire output.
We end up with the model by Gibbons and Rutten. This is, of course, an
invitation to add to the model a third citizen with limited probability of
winning that still does not produce anything to see if the citizen has any
bearing on outcomes. The framework by Hirshleifer and Skaperdas is
not, however, appropriate for investigating this question, for a citizen
with little resources will have very small odds of winning and therefore
of altering the outcome. Let us make sure of this before turning to
models where such questions can be posed in a more satisfactory way.
Consider the three player game in Table 5, where citizen A chooses
rows, citizen B chooses columns, and citizen K chooses nothing. What
we want to see is the effect that changes in the likelihood of winning
have on the equilibria of the game.
Table 5. Coercive authority
C

D

C

6p(3, 3, 0), 6p(3, 3, 0), 6p(0, 3. 3)

4p(0, 4, 0), 4p(4, 0, 0), 4p(0, 4, 0)

D

4p(4, 0, 0), 4p(0, 4, 0), 4p(0, 0, 4)

2p(1, 1, 0), 2p(1, 1, 0), 2p(0, 1, 1)

It can be shown that for no value of p(.) that ensures cooperation in
autarchy and that satisﬁes the properties of a contest success function
does the introduction of a citizen with authority make any difference
regarding outcome. However, the gains from cooperation that can be
captured by the ruler can get very close to 50% (depending on the
structure of p(.)). We thus reach the following conclusion, the proof of
which is reproduced in the Appendix:
Proposition 4. In the static game with collective action problems and coercive
authority presented earlier the efﬁcient allocation can be supported as a Nash
equilibrium of the coercive game for any sufﬁciently symmetric distribution of
power, regardless of the introduction of a player without choice set but with
coercive authority (a ruler). However, the set of payoffs attainable by the nonrulers is bounded away from the Pareto frontier of the utility possibility set.

Note that both in the framework by Gibbons and Rutten and in the
framework by Hirshleifer and Skaperdas, the introduction of an agent
with authority is not critical to the solution of the collective action
problem: there is always an equilibrium in autarchy that achieves the
efﬁcient outcome. Ironically, the introduction of such an agent with
authority creates a collective action problem: how to prevent the
empowered agent from capturing efﬁciency gains that he did not
produce. One would want to see in the models that the ruler ’deserves’
the rents he captures in equilibrium by showing that they would have
not existed had he not been present. There is a limited sense in which
this happens in models with persuasive authority, as I show below.
2.6 A Model of Persuasive Authority
If the source of my authority cannot be directly deduced from the
examination of the game, is there really any way in which we can model
it in a formal model of authority? Surprisingly, we can. Even if I do not
have any actions to choose and will not engage in any contest with
anybody to capture part of your output I can nevertheless have authority
over you in some circumstances. What kind of circumstances? Well, I
need you to believe that there is another ‘sucker’ in the game who will
not choose an action that is very good for you if you do not choose the
action I say and give me a fraction of your output. I also need the sucker
to believe that you will choose an action that is bad for him if he does
not give me a fraction of his output. But, why believe me? I have no
good answer for that, but if you two do believe, maybe you will do as I
say, and then the beliefs will support an authority over you that is of the
persuasive type.9

Models with characteristics that are similar to those just discussed
also have been discussed by Akerlof (1976) and Basu (1986). The
feature that distinguishes them from the standard models of strategic
interaction is their triadic nature, that is, models of situations where
individuals do not interact pairwise but in triangular or other multiple
relations. Once triadic relations are allowed a wealth of phenomena can
be explained in game-theoretic language, even if some players have no
direct effect on the outcome.
Suppose that citizens A and B are about to play the following game of
trade: if both agree to trade (C,C), each citizen gets a payoff of 3.
However, if at least one of the citizens does not want to trade, there is no
deal and each gets a payoff of zero. The game is shown in Table 6,
where citizen A chooses rows and citizen B chooses columns.
Now assume that before the citizens play the game citizen K comes
and says privately to each player the following: ‘Your fellow citizen
will trade with you only if you pay me a tax of 3’. Under the world
created by the statement issued by K each player is better off by paying
the tax, and therefore trading than otherwise. The outcome does not
refute the statement issued by K, for it is indeed a situation where both
citizens cooperate and pay the tax and, given that they believe the
statement to be true, neither citizen has a unilateral incentive to deviate.
The players have reached a state of self-conﬁrming equilibrium.10 It
might be assumed that such equilibria are delicate because they rely on
threats that are not credible, but this misses an important point about
how beliefs are instituted and transmitted in society.
2.6.1 Aside: Cultural Beliefs. Think about all the real life situations
where you do not engage in certain behaviors because of the
presumption that something really bad could happen to you. In many of
those situations you did not acquire this presumption or conjecture by
experience (i.e. being actually punished after the ‘bad’ behavior).
Instead, you were told that this was going to happen to you by someone
you trusted. Those conjectures, if shared by the collectivity and not
disproved by experience, will support a self-conﬁrming equilibrium of
Table 6. Game of trade
C

D

C

3, 3

0, 0

D

0, 0

0, 0

the game. I argue that they are the exact content of that which Greif
(1994) calls cultural beliefs. For Greif:
Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several individuals that
govern interaction—between these people, and between them, their gods, and
other groups—and differ from knowledge in that they are not empirically
discovered or analytically proved. (Greif 1994: 915)

Greif insists that there is an analytical beneﬁt from distinguishing
between strategies and cultural beliefs:
Unlike strategies, cultural beliefs are qualities of individuals in the sense that
cultural beliefs that were crystallized with respect to a speciﬁc game affect
decisions in historically subsequent strategic situations. (Greif 1994: 915)

The point is completely made once one realizes that, as with cultural
beliefs, the conjectures that support self-conﬁrming equilibria need not
be well-deﬁned for situations that have never occurred. Moreover, if
one wishes to interpret equilibria as the result of a learning process that
takes place while the individuals interact repeatedly, then it is to selfconﬁrming equilibria, rather than to Nash equilibria, to which those
processes converge.11
2.6.2 Back to ‘Models of Persuasive Authority’. In the example above
citizen K does nothing but appropriate surplus that does not seem to
belong to him; it is somewhat of a bonus associated with being a
persuasive authority. This authority, however, can be employed to
create value, as the following example shows.
Assume that the collective action problem between A and B has the
structure typical of a game of chicken (Table 7). Suddenly, citizen K
announces to each player separately: ‘Your fellow citizen has paid to
me a tax of 12 for me to tell him what to do. I will tell you what I will
tell him if you pay me a tax of 12. If you do not pay, my
recommendation to the other will be C with probability 12 and D with
probability 12’. Now, if each citizen believes the statement made by K,
and both know that K will just ﬂip a coin to decide on what
recommendation to give between (D,C) and (C,D), then each individual
will pay the tax, listen to the recommendation, and indeed play what
citizen K has told her to do. In other words, the citizens will be ‘frozen’
Table 7. Game of chicken
C

D

C

3, 3

1, 4

D

4, 1

0, 0

in a correlated equilibrium of the game.12 In it, each citizen gets a
payoff of 2, net of taxes, which is no smaller than what they were
getting in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (12C  12D, 12C  12D), i.e.
2.
This is no real service, however, for they could have done just as well
by ﬂipping the coin themselves and doing without the tax, just as in the
models with utilitarian and coercive authority. Indeed, by costless
communication, players could achieve any convex combination of the
payoffs that can be supported in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of
the game by correlating their strategies using a randomization device
that is publicly observable. Here is, however, a payoff proﬁle that
cannot be achieved without help from citizen K: (2127 , 2127 ), and also a
way to achieve it: change the tax to 121 and have everyone know that K
will select with probability 13 each of the following proﬁles of recom
mendations: (D,C), (C,D) and (C,C). However, this time K will only tell
the player her own recommended strategy. Again, the recommendation
from K has no binding force, yet both players will pay the tax, play as K
recommended, and achieve the payoff proﬁle presented above. The
proof is reproduced in the Appendix.
It would seem that a person of inﬂuence can do a lot of good, or a lot
of harm to the rest of the members of society solely by virtue of her
persuasive authority, but there are two reasons why this is not always
true. First, pure inﬂuence has no effect in many games of interest, and
that is the reason why I switched from the Prisoner’s Dilemma to other
games. Importantly, if the source of citizen K’s authority is purely
persuasive there is nothing he could say: no massaging of beliefs, no
propaganda, or ideology, or promise or threat, that he could employ to
inﬂuence citizens A and B away from the choice of (D,D) in the static
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Furthermore, this follows from the revelation
principle for games with complete information. To see why, recall that
according to the revelation principle, if there is a communication
system with or without a mediator such that a certain outcome can be
achieved as an equilibrium of the game with communication, then it
can also be achieved by a correlated equilibrium of the game. But C is
strictly dominated in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and therefore not
rationalizable. This means that no strategy in a correlated equilibrium
will place positive probability on action C, and so the collective action
problem will remain invariant under the addition of a player with
persuasive authority. This may suggest that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is
not the right collective action problem to employ when formulating
models of limited government.13 The second reason why the govern

ment again may be a redundant entity is that, in games with more than
three citizens, communication mechanisms have been identiﬁed that
would implement any correlating device that citizen K could possibly
employ at no cost to the citizen except, perhaps, unmodeled commu
nication costs.
What we have seen here is a discussion that stresses the role of
beliefs held by certain players in the game that can have effects on the
outcomes, yet those beliefs cannot be directly deduced from the
examination of the game. The literature refers to those as supporting
self-conﬁrming equilibria and correlated equilibria.14 More importantly,
they seem to be the natural vehicle to discuss the content of the terms
inﬂuence, cultural beliefs and ideology. The role of ideology has
traditionally been neglected in formal models of institutions, not
because anybody believed it was a useless concept,15 but because it is
very elusive. This situation has not changed, of course, but at least now
there is a chance for formal insight where there was none.
3. Discussion
The relationship between the presence of a limited government and the
type and size of collective action problems in the equilibria of social
systems is far less than transparent: It depends a great deal on the type
of actions and beliefs that support the authority held by the govern
ment. In all the models studied above, the outcomes achievable thanks
to government intervention were also achievable without it, and this
conclusion needed no additional assumptions to those already in the
pertinent theory. But are these conclusions general enough, or are they
an artifact of the speciﬁc models of utilitarian, coercive and persuasive
authority studied above? In this section, I provide an answer to this
question.
3.1 Preliminaries
An examination of the common features of all the models studied
above reveals that the effects that utilitarian and coercive authority
have on the outcomes of the situations analyzed are qualitatively
different from the effects that persuasive authority may have. Speciﬁ
cally, the introduction of a ruler with utilitarian or coercive authority
affects the outcomes of the situation through explicit changes on the
structure of the game that is played by the citizens. The introduction of
a ruler with persuasive authority alters the outcomes through a different

channel: that of affecting the beliefs that the citizens have about each
other’s actions. Despite this difference, the argument that explains the
redundancy of governmental authority is very similar in both cases, but
the difference makes it necessary to separate the analyses. I proceed
ﬁrst with the easiest case.
3.2 Communication Costs and the Demand for Government
I previously gave examples of models of persuasive authority that
show how the revelation principle can be used to understand why
persuasive authority has no bite in many games of interest. The
examples imply no loss of generality in the sense that the same
arguments can be used to show that persuasive authority will have no
bite in general. The key to the argument is to realize that, when the
original game among the citizens is enhanced to include a ruler with
persuasive authority, the ruler is playing the role of a communication
system in the sense of Myerson (1991). But the revelation principle for
games with complete information states that the equilibrium achieved
by the game with the ruler can be simulated by a correlated equilibrium
of the original game. Therefore, if communication costs are negligible
relative to the rents captured by the ruler, then the ruler’s presence is
eminently redundant.
3.3 Contracting Costs and the Demand for Government
The actions chosen by a ruler with utilitarian authority alter the
structure of the game that ends up being played by the citizens, and
therefore the outcomes that one obtains in equilibrium. One may
believe that these changes in the structure of the game are necessary for
cooperation to be established. This is, however, not the case: the
conditions under which the actions of the ruler induce the cooperative
outcome also allow the cooperative outcome to be an equilibrium of the
game in anarchy. This is so because, technically, the ruler can only
change the structure of the game in the same ways in which the
introduction of costless contracting changes the structure of the game.
The assumption that costless contracting is available is strong, but it
is not required in the present context because the type of costless
contracting that is available to the players in the model of utilitarian
authority is that of costless implicit contracting, which is in turn
possible due to a sufﬁciently high probability of the game being
repeated. As a consequence, if an outcome cannot be attained as an
equilibrium of the contract-signing game, then it cannot be attained as

an equilibrium of the game with a utilitarian or coercive ruler.
Therefore, if contracting costs are negligible relative to the rents
captured by the ruler, then the ruler’s presence is eminently redun
dant.
3.4 The Costs of Conﬂict and the Demand for Government
In the model of coercive authority what allows cooperation to occur is
that the presence of explicit conﬂicts lowers the relative beneﬁts of
defection. This is so because conﬂict is modeled in such a way that the
producer of most of the output gets the highest probability of success in
the conﬂict, and therefore the defector gets a lower expected payoff
from defection than in the case without conﬂict. In addition to this,
whenever the value of defecting has been sufﬁciently lowered to induce
cooperation in the absence of a ruler, the introduction of a ruler makes
no difference regarding outcomes. The intuition is that the fact that the
ruler does not engage in any productive activities places a limit on the
amount of rent that it can capture in any situation, and this leaves
unaltered the relative merits of the different strategies that the citizens
can follow. Therefore, if the costs of engaging in conﬂict activities are
negligible relative to the rents captured by the ruler, then the ruler’s
presence is eminently redundant.

4. Conclusions
Parsons (1963) suggested that there are basically three kinds of
authority: utilitarian authority, coercive authority, and persuasive
authority. The ﬁrst goal of this paper was to show that the models
developed by Gibbons and Rutten (1997), Hirshleifer (1991), Ska
perdas (1992), Akerlof (1976) and Basu (1986) can be viewed as
models where issues such as authority, power, inﬂuence and ideology,
in the sense of Parsons, can be formally discussed.
These game-theoretic representations of the forms of authority
studied by Parsons can be used to analyze the extent to which the
presence of a government with Parsonian authority can solve the
collective action problems embedded in a situation of anarchy. In all
the models studied in the paper, the outcomes achievable thanks to
government intervention were also achievable without it, regardless of
the type of authority suporting governmental actions, and this conclu
sion needed no additional assumptions to those already in the pertinent

theory. I also argued that these conclusions are not an artifact of the
speciﬁc models of utilitarian, coercive and persuasive authority studied,
but that they ultimately depend on how unmodeled communication,
contracting and coercion costs would compare to the rents that the ruler
obtains from the interaction.
Aside from the important issue of how it is that a ruler may
economize on communication, contracting and coercion costs, this
leads to an interpretation of the state that cannot be contractarian in
nature: citizens would not empower a ruler to solve collective action
problems in any of the models discussed, for the ruler would always be
redundant and costly. The results support a view of the state that is
eminently predatory, case in which whether the collective action
problems are solved by the state or not depends upon whether this is
consistent with the objectives and opportunities of those with the
(natural) monopoly of violence in society. This conclusion is also
reached in a model of a predatory state by Moselle and Polak (1997).
How the theory of economic policy changes in light of this inter
pretation is an important question left for further work.
I would like to conclude by stressing that it does not follow from the
results presented in the present paper that a contractarian interpretation
of the state cannot be achieved in the language of game theory and
supported by a reasonable notion of authority. It does follow, however,
that it is not appropriate for the arguments that support such
interpretations to crucially depend on unmodeled and arbitrarily high
transaction costs. The results from this paper can therefore be viewed
as pointing to the kinds of environments and costs that need to be
explicitly studied to fully support the activities and the authority of the
State, whether contractarian or predatory, in non-cooperative models of
rationality, self-interest and equilibrium.
NOTES
I want to thank Kaushik Basu, Robert Gibbons, Andrew Rutten, Randy Calvert, Kim-Sau
Chung, Francisco Rodrı́guez, Eduardo Saavedra, three anonymous referees and partici
pants at the III International Meeting of the Latin American Law and Economics
Association for their comments to a previous version of this work. All remaining
shortcomings are mine.
1. See Cooter (1982).
2. Some of those efforts include the work of the Washington School (Barzel 1989; Levi
1988; North 1981; Olson 1993), the Virginia School (Brennan and Buchanan 1985;
Tollison 1982; Tullock 1980), the Chicago School (Stigler 1971; Becker 1983;
Peltzman 1976; Baron 1989), the California School (Calvert 1994; Greif et al. 1994),

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

the neo-Hobbesian school (Hampton 1986; Hardin 1991; Heckathorn and Maser
1987), and those works reviewed in the present paper.
This is so because the act of obeying is represented, from a decision-theoretic
standpoint, as one that tautologically yields a payoff with sufﬁcient certainty.
Persuasion and utilitarian rewards are, in a decision-theoretic sense, always present.
This is so because standard decision theory makes no distinction between pleasureseeking and pain-avoiding motivations for behavior.
In contrast, a government modeled as a traditional social planner is omnipotent. See
Dixit (1996: 8).
Other social situations that can be explained using similar tools include rent-seeking
(e.g. Tullock 1988; Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992), tournaments (Rosen 1986),
and electoral campaigns (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995).
Conﬂict is not a choice variable in this context, not because I believe this is
unimportant but because the main point of this sub-section does not hinge on it.
The properties of contest success functions have been thoroughly studied by
Hirshleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1996).
The pioneering work of Hermalin (1998) on the study of leadership can be interpreted
as being precisely about what the sources of persuasive authority are in an
environment of incomplete information. In contrast, I show that persuasive authority
can have a role even in complete information environments.
For a formal deﬁnition, and its relationship with standard solution concepts, see
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a). Basu (1986) and Akerlof (1976) in their papers used a
solution concept that is in a sense a precursor of the concept of self-conﬁrming
equilibrium, see also Hahn (1987).
See, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993).
For a formal deﬁnition and an excellent discussion of the subject, see Myerson
(1991).
For an excellent discussion that uses different arguments than those I give here about
the dangers of selecting the Prisoners’ Dilemma when other models of collective
action seem more appropriate, see Baird et al. (1994).
Importantly, these concepts are deeply related, see Fudenberg and Levine (1993a).
See, for example, the discussion in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995).

APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
The game played by the citizens in the absence of a ruler is a Prisoners’
Dilemma with an outside option. In this case the set of payoff proﬁles
attainable by the citizens is { (1,1)}, corresponding to the equilibria
{(D,D),(D,O),(O,D),(O,O)}. I want to show now that in any Nash
equilibrium of the game with a ruler, the set of payoff proﬁles attainable
by the citizens is also {(1,1)}. To see this we have to consider two cases.
First there is a case where one of the players select their outside options,
and their payoff proﬁle is (1,1), no matter what the ruler does. The other
case involves no citizen selecting their outside option. Unilateral
cooperation cannot be made an equilibrium for any tax system t because

against defection the remaining citizen can always take the outside
option and not cooperate. Mutual defection can be an equilibrium, but
only if td  0. Similarly, mutual cooperation is sustainable as an
equilibrium only if tc  2 and tf  3. In all these cases the payoff proﬁle
for the citizens is (1,1).
Proof of Proposition 2
First, I want to show that the citizens will not want to support a tax τ that
is greater than 4q  2. To see this, one notices that any citizen gets a
payoff from following the strategy outlined above equal to:
V  (3  τ)  qV, or
V

3  τ
1q

The payoff that a citizen obtains from deviating from such strategy is at
most:
4

1
1  q

The ﬁrst term corresponds to the expected payoff the citizen gets from
defecting, obtaining a payoff of 4. The second term corresponds to the
expected payoff the citizen obtains if the game continues, citizens A and
B stick to their strategy, and the ruler places no tax on mutual defection.
Therefore, a citizen will not want to deviate from the announced
r
1
strategies if 13
q ≥ 4  1q, that is, if τ ≤ 4q  2.
I now want to show that the lower bound on τ imposed by the ruler’s
ability to accept higher taxes on smaller outcomes is 4  3q. The
expected payoff for the ruler that deviates from setting a tax on
cooperation no greater than τ is at most 6  12 q.
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the expected payoff the ruler gets if
completely abusing the citizens capturing the entire output after they
cooperate. The second term corresponds to the expected payoff the ruler
gets if the game continues, citizens A and B stick to their strategy, and
the ruler, again, completely abuses the citizens capturing the entire
output. Now note that the payoff for the ruler that accepts a tax on
cooperation of τ is:
V  2τ  qV, or
V

2τ
1q

so that it is best for the ruler not to deviate from a tax on mutual
cooperation of τ if:
2τ
2
≥6
, that is, if τ ≥ 4  3q.
1q
1q
As a consequence of the calculations presented earlier, the set of
admissible tax rates on mutual cooperation that can be supported in any
efﬁcient subgame perfect equilibrium is [4–3q, 4q  2] for q ≥ 67, which
is a set that goes to [1,2] as q approaches 1. The gains from cooperation
per capita in this setup are 2 per period, so any tax on cooperation
captures at least 50% of those gains for any probability of continuation q
that sustains the equilibrium, and therefore the payoffs attainable by the
citizens are bounded away from the Pareto frontier of their utility
possibility set.

Proof of Proposition 4
Because of the structure of p(.) we can rewrite the game as:
C

D

C

6p1, 6p1, 6p1(1  2p1)

4p, 4(1  2p), 4p

D

4(1  2p), 4p, 4p

2p2, 2p2, 2(1  2p2)

Where p1:  p(3, 3, 0), p2:  p(1, 1, 0) and p:  p(0, 4, 0), and the
following relationships follow:
(1  2p) > p1 >

1
1
> p and p1 >
3
2

Now note that for no p that ensures cooperation in autarchy and that
satisﬁes the properties of the function p(.) the introduction of a citizen
with authority makes any difference regarding outcomes. To see why
note that for any p in (14, 13) we know that 29 < 23 (1  2p) < 13 < p1, so that
4(1  2p) < 6p1 and hence C is a best response against C. Moreover,
since 12 > p2 we know that 4p > 1 > 2p2 and hence C is also a best
response against D. Therefore, the game is dominance solvable with
solution (C,C). However, there are no further restrictions on p1 besides
p1 < 1  2p and p1 < 12, so the value of p1 can get close to 13 as p is closest
to 13. This means that the expected payoff for the ruler can get close to 2,
which is exactly 50% of the gains from cooperation.

Citizens Obey The Ruler in a Correlated Equilibrium of the
Game in Models of Persuasive Authority
The argument is taken from Myerson (1991: 251), although he does not
have the mediator charge anything for his services.
When citizen A is told ‘C’ she knows that citizen B was told to do
either D or C, with equal probability, and does not win from deviating to
D because from either choice she gets a payoff of 111
12. On the other hand,
if citizen A is told ‘D’, then she knows that citizen B was told to do C,
case in which his best response is D. Therefore, citizen A obeys the
command by citizen K if she expects B to obey, too. A similar argument
applies to citizen B.
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